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INTERNATIONAL LAW
Compelling Dumping in the United States:
Can Foreign Governments Shield Unfair Trade Practices?
by Michael P. Waxman




Argued November 12, 1985
Over the past fifteen years, while the United States
balance of trade deficits burgeoned and the American
consumer expressed a significant preference for "cheap-
er"Japanese goods, courts of the United States have had
an uncomfortable task. They have had to decide
whether the fact that the Japanese government "compel-
led" Japanese electronic manufacturers to sell in the
United States at prices significantly below those in Japan
precludes U.S. courts from reviewing the legality of
those acts. As the Court analyzes this issue, it must try to
avoid being forced to choose between a political Scylla
and an international Charybdis: American public opin-
ion voicing concern about the effect of foreign source
sales on United States industry and the international
pressure from foreign governments (such as Australia,
Canada, France and the United Kingdom).
However the Court decides the foreign sovereign
compulsion issue, the effects of this decision will be
substantial and long lasting. Either international politics
and law will become embroiled in a struggle to ascertain
the extent of domestic court power to review a foreign
sovereign's laws and actions or Congress and United
States agencies which regulate international trade must
immediately revamp the process to avoid a blanket im-
munity by a foreign government placing a "compulsion"
seal on their foreign trade planning.
ISSUES
There are two significant issues in this case. One
requires the Court to resolve the conflict between en-
forcing United States trade laws and respecting the
rights of a foreign sovereign. The other addresses evi-
dentiary standards for anticompetitive conduct. The
Court must determine:
1. Whether the court of appeals properly interpreted
the legal standards for sufficiency of evidence of an
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antitrust conspiracy by concluding that the ques-
tioned actions were more representative of concerted
action than independent action, and 2) whether the
court of appeals erred in finding liability for a viola-
tion of the Sherman Act if the predicate conduct was
compelled by a foreign government.
FACTS
Fourteen years ago, in December 1970, the National
Union Electric Corporation (NUE) filed a complaint
alleging that Japanese television manufacturers, their
subsidiaries, and a Japanese trading company and its
United States subsidiary were violating United States
antitrust, tariff and anti-dumping laws. In September of
1974, Zenith Radio Corporation (Zenith) filed a similar
complaint claiming that all of those named in the NUE
complaint as well as some other subsidiaries, Motorola,
Inc. and Sears Roebuck Co. had violated sections I and 2
of the Sherman Act (conspiracy in restraint of trade and
attempted monopolization). In November, 1974, the
NUE action was cnsolidated for trial with the Zenith suit.
The Supreme Court will now determine whether a sum-
mary judgment dismissal by the district court was cor-
rect or that the parties may begin the long march to
determination of the substantive issues.
This case developed in the golden days of yesteryear
when trade deficits were a foreign problem, not ours. In
1968, Japanese manufacturers supplied 28% of U.S.
television sets; three years earlier, their market share
had been only 10%. The United States Tariff Commis-
sion (now the U.S. International Trade Commission)
reported in 1971 that the decline in TV set prices in the
American market was significantly influenced by the
Japanese TV manufacturers' ability to undersell the
American manufacturers. This resulted in lost profits
and lost jobs for many American TV companies. NUE
claims that it was forced from the market by the de-
fendants' conspiracy to keep television sets in Japan
priced artificially high, thereby enabling the defendants
to sell televisions at artificially low prices in America.
Zenith complains that it incurred operating losses and a
loss of profits by the defendants' sales of television sets,
radios and other electronic equipment at depressed
prices.
NUE & Zenith stress two key activities of the Japa-
nese defendants as being highly indicative of a conspir-
acy. First, NUE and Zenith claim that there was a check-
price agreement among seven of the principal Japanese
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manufacturers of televisions which established mini-
mum prices (it is a violation of U.S. antitrust law to set
either a maximum or minimum resale price) for televi-
sions sold in America. Second, NUE and Zenith claim
that those seven manufacturers were also members of
the Japan Machinery Exporters Association, an export
trade association which instituted a requirement in 1967
that each member limit to five the number of its custom-
ers in the United States. Both of these activities would
normally constitute a per se violation under section 1 of
the Sherman Act. However, in 1975, the Japanese Min-
istry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) (on
behalf of the Japanese government) informed the dis-
trict court that they compelled the defendants to abide
by the check-price agreement and also directed certain
regulations of the Japan Machinery Exporters Associa-
tion. Accordingly, the defendants claimed that since the
agreements were compelled by the Japanese govern-
ment, they could not serve as a basis for imposing anti-
trust liability.
The district court granted summary judgment dis-
missing the action for all twenty-four defendants. The
court's determination to dispose of NUE and Zenith's
claims under the Wilson Tariff Act and sections 1 and 2
of the Sherman Act sprung from its conclusion that
there was no admissible evidence from which concerted
action, a necessary element of these claims, could be
found. Finally, NUE and Zenith's claims under the Anti-
Dumping Act of 1916 were dismissed. Not only was the
absence of a conspiracy considered in dismissing the
anti-dumping claims, but the noncomparability of the
products was of primary importance. Because the dis-
trict court found that NUE and Zenith failed to present
any admissible evidence that would support the neces-
sary element of a conspiracy, it did not need to consider
the defendants' claim that their conduct was compelled
by the Japanese government and therefore precluded
from review under the "foreign sovereign compulsion"
defense.
Alter reviewing the district court's evidentiary rul-
ings, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit re-
versed the district court's grant of summary judgment
on all of the antitrust counts except as to defendants
Motorola, Sears and Sony. Also, in a separate opinion
the court of appeals reversed the district court's sum-
mary judgment awards as they pertained to the Anti-
Dumping Act of 1916 (723 F.2d 238 and 319 (1983)).
The court of appeals concluded there was both direct
and circumstantial evidence of certain kinds of con-
certed action among the defendants and that some di-
rect evidence might be circumstantial evidence of a
broader conspiracy.
To establish that the artificially low prices in the U.S.
were the result of a conspiracy among the defendants,
NUE and Zenith introduced various documents (diaries
and memoranda), Japanese administrative proceedings
against some of the defendants and expert testimony
relating to the records and documents. While the district
court refused to admit this material, the court of appeals
found this material admissible. The court of appeals
concluded that a factfinder could reasonably infer that
conditions in theJapanese market (high fixed costs, high
debt-equity ratios and a more stable workforce) created
an incentive for the defendants to find a market able to
take on some of their excess production.
Having established a motive, the court of appeals
next concentrated on the legal standards for sufficiency
of evidence of a conspiracy. The court concluded that
both direct evidence and circumstantial evidence may be
considered in testing for a conspiracy. It found that not
only was there parallel conduct among the defendants
but that there was also "direct" evidence that the Japa-
nese defendants colluded (i.e., that check-price
agreement and the five company rule in the U.S. and
the price maintenance agreement in Japan). According
to the court of appeals, this was enough evidence to
defeat summaryjudgment.
The court of appeals addressed the defendants' de-
fenses to NUE and Zenith's charge of a violation of
section 1 of the Sherman Act and the Wilson Tariff Act
and found that a summary judgment in the defendants'
favor would be improper. Of particular significance is
the fact that the court of appeals rejected the de-
fendants' defense of sovereign compulsion. The court of
appeals opinion refers to MITI's participation as
"apparent encouragement" of the defendants in one
instance, and as a possible mere umbrella under which
defendants gained an exemption from Japanese anti-
trust law in another. However, in its separate opinion
reversing the district court's dismissal of the dumping
charges (except as to Sony, Sears and Motorola) the
same panel "assumed that the minimum price
agreement of which all the Japanese defendants were
members, was mandated by the Ministry of Interna-
tional Trade and Industry." Thus, there is a discrepancy
in the court of appeals' categorization of the Japanese
government's involvement.
The court of appeals also found that there were
material issues of fact as to whether the Japanese compa-
nies, together, attempted to acquire or maintain monop-
oly power to exclude cognpetition from the market and
therefore reversed the district court's summary judg-
ment in favor of the defendants on the Sherman Act
section 2 charge.
Likewise, the trial court's summary judgment dis-
missing Zenith's claim under the Robinson-Patman Act
with regard to price discrimination among American
customers was reversed because it was predicated on the
contention that no conspiracy finding was possible. The
trial court's dismissal of Zenith's section 7 claim was also
reversed (except as to Sears, Motorola and Sony).
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In the separate opinion reversing the district court's
dismissal of the dumping charges, four issues were con-
sidered. The first issue the court of appeals addressed
was whether the 1953 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce
and Navigation with Japan bars NUE and Zenith's
claims under the 1916 Act. The court of appeals held
that the Treaty does not bar the dumping claims. The
second issue was whether there was a price differential
between two comparable products-one which is sold in
the exporting country and one which is sold in tihe U.S.,
so as to constitute the first element under the 1916 Act
(comparability between products). The court of appeals
concluded that the two products were comparable
under the 1916 Act. Next, the court looked at whether
the defendants sold consumer electronic products in the
U.S. at substantially lower prices than they were sold in
Japan. Its conclusion was that there was a material issue
of fact on this point. Finally, the court concluded that in
considering the evidence of intent, there were genuine
issues of fact which precluded a summary judgment
award in the defendants' favor. It should be noted that
NUE and Zenith charged each individual with violations
of the Act, thus making them subject to liability under
the Anti-Dumping Act regardless of whether a conspir-
acy claim is upheld.
BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE
Zenith and NUE in this case have alleged significant
antitrust violations. The district court's summary judg-
ment dismissal for Zenith and NUE's failure to allege
and provide sufficient evidence to warrant judgment if
they went to trial followed the traditional analysis of
evidentiary issues in antitrust cases. Normally, evidence
of parallel conduct will be sufficient evidence of an anti-
competitive agreement only if the conduct is shown to be
inconsistent with the independent competitive interests
of the defendant and therefore more likely to be the
result of collusion. (See Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v. Par-
amount Film Distributing Corp., 346 U.S. 537 (1954).) If
Zenith and NUE can prove an anti-competitive conspir-
acy only through circumstantial evidence in the form of
parallel conduct, the district court would be correct in
dismissing the action unless the activity can be shown to
be inconsistent with the normal independent compet-
itive interest of each defendant. (First National Bank v.
Cities Service Co., 391 U.S. 253 (1968)) Arguably, the
conduct of the Japanese defendants could have been in
their own self-interest because even though they were
selling products below the costs of the plaintiffs, it is
possible they were still turning a profit.
However, the court of appeals concluded that this
test was not applicable here because there was "direct"
evidence of collusion among the defendants. Specifi-
cally, the court of appeals found the resale price
agreement in Japan, the use of check-prices and the
five-company rule for exports to the United States to be
examples of "direct" evidence that the defendants had
colluded in some way, and interpreted this as possible
circumstantial evidence of a broader conspiracy to main-
tain artificially low prices for their products sold in tie
United States. Therefore, according to the court of ap-
peals, the cases dealing merely with the legal conclusions
which may be drawn from circumstantial evidence did
not stied light on his case because of its unique combina-
tion of "direct" and circumstantial evidence.
The Court, in reviewing the parallel conduct, must
determine whether or not there was sufficient evidence
to warrant a conclusion that defendants' sales at the
prices complained of were actually in their self-interest.
As the Court assesses the relationship between the
circumstantial and direct evidence, it must examine the
legal significance, in Japan, of the resale price
agreement, the check-price agreement and the five-
company rule. This will require the Court to consider
whether the defendants were "compelled" by the Japa-
nese government to act in concert to enforce these
agreements and tile rule in the United States.
The foreign sovereign compulsion doctrine is a com-
mon law creation of the courts of the United States. The
doctrine is founded on the act of state doctrine principle
that United States courts should preclude themselves
from considering claims which would require them to
review the legality of the acts of a foreign sovereign.
Although the act of state doctrine had its origins in
international comity and respect for the independence
of foreign sovereigns its rationale has evolved to gain
significant support from considerations of the indepen-
dent role of the executive branch to foster and maintain
foreign relations. The foreign sovereign compulsion
doctrine directs courts to preclude tnemselves from re-
viewing the legality of the acts of a defendant where that
defendant has been "compelled" by a foreign sovereign
to perform or omit a certain act even when such per-
formance or omission may have had an illegal effect in
America.
The Court in Zenith must boldly state whether a
defendant's activity, "compelled" by a foreign govern-
ment, constitutes a defense to antitrust suits. If the
Court supports such a defense, it must then define the
parameters of what will suffice as a "compelled" activity.
In prior cases, courts have rarely found the action by
the defendants to be compelled by the foreign sover-
eign. The compulsion analysis has generally broken into
four categories based on the involvement of the foreign
government: 1) conduct "compelled" (mandated, re-
quired) by the foreign government with surveillance to
insure compliance; 2) conduct approved by the foreign
government; 3) conduct encouraged by the foreign gov-
ernment, and 4) conduct made possible by a delegation
of power by the foreign government.
United States' courts have held that mere permission
or even approval of a defendant's actions by a foreign
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sovereign have been insufficient to establish compul-
sion. Rather, the foreign law must have coerced the
defendant into violating American antitrust law. This
coercion has been further categorized by courts to de-
mand that the foreign government required the action
or inaction and that such requirement did not arise due
to lobbying by the defendant.
The only case clearly applying the foreign sovereign
compulsion defense is Interamerican Refining Corp. v.
Texaco Maracaibo, Inc. (307 F. Supp. 1291 (D.C. Del.
1970)). In InterAmerican, Venezuela prohibited exporta-
tion of crude oil intended for Interamerican (a New
Jersey corporation whose officers were political enemies
of the Venezuelan government leaders). InterAmer;can
sued the suppliers of crude oil operating in Venezuela
and a middleman, alleging a refusal to deal in violation
of the antitrust laws. The district court held that sover-
eign compulsion made the defendants' restrictive trade
practices into "acts of the sovereign" that United States
courts could not review. It was the Venezuelan govern-
ment's order, which essentially offered the defendants
the choice of complying with the Venezuelan decree or
terminating their business, which served to compel the
action of the defendants.
The Court may need to fashion a standard of review
to guide lower courts in weighing the effect of the de-
fense. It may decide either that "compelled" activity may
serve as a blanket defense to what would normally be a
per se violation of antitrust law or it may merely decide to
apply a rule of reason test to such circumstances and
thereby embrace a balancing of the needs of the two
governmental policies.
Whatever the holding in Zenith, the Supreme Court
will be making a major statement as to the role of Ameri-
can courts in international trade. In light of their activity
and participation as amicus curiae some of our major
foreign trading partners have indicated a significant
interest in the outcome of this case. The United States
Department of Justice has strongly supported the inter-
ests of these governments in their ability to have unfet-
tered participation in the foreign trading practices of
their constituent businesses. By contrast, certain U.S.
industries and their supporters are seriously concerned
about the shield that the foreign sovereign compulsion
defense will provide to foreign manufacturers who bla-
tantly violate U.S. unfair trade regulations. If foreign
competitors may be "compelled" by their governments
to undercut their U.S. competitors while supporting
their activities with profits from protected markets to
home, U.S. manufacturers may be whipsawed.
ARGUMENTS
For Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. (Counsel of
Record, Donald J. Zoeller, 180 Maiden Lane, New York, NY
10038; telephone (212) 510-7000)
1. The court of appeals erred by failing to apply the
Cities Service conspiracy inference standard. This
standard requires that an antitrust conspiracy cannot
be inferred in the absence of a rational motive to
conspire and conduct against independent economic
self-interest.
2. Participation in export controls which the govern-
ment of Japan has attested that it compelled cannot
constitute a feature of an antitrust violation. This
action is protected by the "foreign sovereign compul-
sion" and "act of state" doctrines.
For Zenith Radio Corporaton (Counsel of Record, Edwin P.
Rome, 120 Four Penn Center, Philadelphia, PA 19103; tele-
phone (215) 569-5500)
1. The Court of Appeals correctly held that the direct
and circumstantial evidence of a conspiracy is suffi-
cient to create a genuine issue of fact. Proof of action
contrary to economic self-interest although probative
and often sufficient proof of conspiracy is not a sine
qua non of conspiracy evidence in all cases.
2. Matsushita's involvement was simply a constituent
element in a broader unlawful arrangement. Com-
mercial acts implemented by acts within the territorial
boundaries of the United States and have intended
effects on United States Trade and Commerce are
not immune from United States law even if "compel-
led" by a foreign government.
AMICUS BRIEFS
In Support of Matsushita
The United States of America; and, a brief on behalf
of the governments of Australia, Canada, France, and
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland.
In Support of Zenith
The Semiconductor Industry Association
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